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BILLS AND NOTES-POST-DATED CHECKS-EFFECT OF TRANSFER BEFORE THE. DuE
DAT-E-The defendant delivered a check on March 6th and dated it March 7th,
with the understanding that it should not be presented for payment until that
date. It was, however, negotiated to the plaintiff for value without notice on the
6th. On the 7th the defendant ordered payment stopped. An action was then
brought on the check. Held, that the plaintiff should recover. American
National Bank v. Wheeler (igig, Calif. App.) 187 Pac. 128.
The court in the principal case correctly treated the check as fully negotiable
though post-dated. For a discussion of the status of post-dated checks, see
COMMENT (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 321.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INCOME TAX-STcK DIVIDENDS AS INcoME.-In Jan-
uary, 1916, the Standard Oil Company of California, which then had surplus
and undivided profits almost equaling the par value of its outstanding capital
stock, issued additional shares of its capital stock to the amount of fifty per
cent of that outstanding and transferred from its surplus account to its capital
stock account an amount equivalent to the par value of the stock so issued.
The jlaintiff, having paid under protest, an income tax computed upon the par
value of 18.o7 per cent of the stock so issued (the percentage which the gov-
ernment computed had been earned since March 1, 1913, the date taken as
approximating that of the adoption of the Sixteenth 'Amendment), brought suit
against the collector of internal revenue to recover the amount so paid. Held
(four Justices dissenting), that the plaintiff should recover since Rev. Act,
Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, sec. 2a, 39 Stat. L. 756, attempting to levy a tax upon stock
dividends without apportionment according to population is unconstitutional,
such- "dividends" not being income and hence not within the Sixteenth Amend-
ment. Eisner v. Macomber (192o) 4o Sup. Ct. 189.
See ARTICLE, supra, p. 735.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FuLL FAITH AND CREDIT TO JUDGMENTS OF OTHER
STATES.-The defendants by their wrongful acts in Alabama had caused the
death in that state of the plaintiff's intestate, for which the plaintiff obtained
judgment in the courts of that state. The judgment not having been paid, the
plaintiff brought. the present action in Illinois upon it. An Illinois statute
provided that "no action shall be brought in this state to recover damages for
a death occurring outside of this state." The Supreme Court of Illinois sus-
tained a plea to the jurisdiction. Held, that the judgment was erroneous as a
violation of Article 4, section i of the federal Constitution. Kenney v. Suprene
Lodge, etc.;Loyal Order of Moose (April 19, 192o) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term,
1919, Nos. 269 and 303.
The decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in this case was severely criticised
and the present view of the Supreme Court advanced in (igig) 28 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 264. As was there pointed out, to adopt the view of the Illinois court
meant the nullification of the full faith and credit clause, in effect, and was
directly contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in Fauntleroy v. Lum
(19o8) 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641. The Supreme Court has so held in the
principal case, and limited an earlier decision, opposed in its dicta, at least, to
its particular facts. See Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Co. (903)
191 U. S. 373, 24 Sup. Ct. 92, (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 267, note 6a.
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CONTRACTrs-CoNsmEATioN-AcTs DONE IN RELIANCE UP6N A PROMIS--
The decedent left an informal document, which was ineffective as a will because
not witnessed. In this paper the intestate cut off the defendant, his brother,
with a legacy of ten dollars. After this document was found all of the heirs
and the distributees of the estate mutually agreed to carry out the wishes of the
intestate and to consider the document as his last will and testament. In pur-
suance of this agreement, three of the heirs moved from their own home to the
homestead of the decedent and carried on the farm and milk route of the dece-
dent, one of the heirs giving up his own business to do so. Subsequently the
defendant refused to carry out the agreement on the ground that their signa-
tures had been obtained by misrepresentation, and the other heirs sued for
specific performance. Held, that the plaintiffs should have specific performance.
Capen v. Capen (I92O, Mass.) 125 N. E. 692.
The court properly found consideration in the payment to be made to the
defendant, in the mutuality of. the promises, and in the various acts done by
certain of the plaintiffs in reliance upon the promise of the defendants, although
these acts clearly appear not to have been an inducing cause of the promise.
See Corbin, Does a Pre-Existing Duty Defeat Consideration? (1918) 27 YALE
LAw JOURNAL, 362, 366; see also the cases collected in Anson, Contract (3d Am.
ed. by Corbin, igig) sec. 127 and notes.
CONTRACTS-UNILATERAL CONTRACT-PAST CONSIDERATION-BROKER'S COM-
MIssoN-The plaintiff negotiated with the Aetna Explosives Company on behalf
of the defendant, perhaps without authority, the result being that the defendant
later contracted with that company to supply it with six hundred tons of
sulphuric acid per month for twelve months at twenty-seven dollars per ton,
specifically promising the Aetna Company in that contract to pay the plaintiff
as broker a commission of one per cent, "said brokerage to be paid as payments
of the price were received by the defendant." After a few small deliveries
had been made, on which the commission was paid to the plaintiff, the Aetna
Company got into financial difficulties; it agreed with the defendant to rescind
the contract for acid and paid to the defendant the sum of $45,6oo as considera-
tion. Held, that the defendant was bound to pay the agreed commission on
the agreed purchase price of the entire amount of acid, and not merely on the
$45,ooo received, whether the defendant had employed the plaintiff as broker
or merely promised to pay fot his services knowing that they had been rendered
with expectation of pay from him. Suter v. Farmers' Fertilizer Co. (igig,
Ohio) 126 N. E. 304.
See- COMMENTS, supra, p. 767.
CONTRACTS-WRITTEN DOCUMENTS-PAROL AGREEMENTS.-The plaintiff sued on
a written document signed by the defendant in which the defendant promised to
pay for a book to be compiled by the plaintiff and delivered at a future date.
Evidence was admitted to show that this document was accompanied by an oral
agreement that it should become operative only when the defendant should notify
the plaintiff of his willingness to have it become a contract, and that he had not
thus notified the plaintiff. Held, that the plaintiff should not recover. Massa-
chusetts Biographical Society v. Howard (1g2o, Mass.) 125 N. E. 6o5.
This is in accordance with the general rule. Although the document was not
signed by the plaintiff and contained no express promise by him to perform the
work specified, yet the court apparently assumed that such a promise should be
implied in fact American Publishing Company v. Walker (igoi) 87 Mo. App.
503; Sanford v. Brown (913) 2o8 N. Y. go, ioi N. E. 797; Doolittle v. Cal-
lender (19Il) 88 Neb. 747, 13o N. W. 436. The evidence relating to the oral
agreement was clearly admissible, because it shows, not only that the document
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was never an operative fact in itself but also that there was never any contract
at all. See Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract (igig) 28 YALE LAW
JoURNAl, 739, 764-68.
DAMAGES-CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS-DuTY TO PAY DAMAGES CAUSED BY
SHE NEGLIGENCE OF EMPoYE.-The defendant maintained a hospital having
a regular schelule of charges, also taking free patients. The decedent, a
pay patient known to -be delirious, was left unguarded in a room with a
window partly open. A nurse, after a short absence, found the window wide
open and the patient dead upon the ground beneath. The decedent's ad-
ministrator sued the defendant claiming that the latter was under a duty to pay
damages because of negligence. Held, that he should recover. Mulliner v. Evan-
gelischer etc. Synod of North America (ig2o, Minn.) 175 N. W. 699.
The court, after a review of the theories for holding or exempting a charitable
corporation for the negligence of its employees, soundly held that the better
reasoning and public policy required that they be held "liable." See in accord,
Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital (I92o, Mass.) 126 N. E. 392; see (1918)
27 YALE. LAW JOURNAL, 951. Hospitals conducted for gain are invariably
held "liable." See Meridian Sanatorium v. Scruggs (192o, Miss.) 83 So. 532, 534.
But charitable corporations were until lately held immune. See (.1917) 26 YALE
LAw JOURNAL, 791.
EVIDENcE-DYING DECLARATioNs-CREDImLITY.-In a trial for murder the
counsel for the state offered in evidence certain declarations of the decedent as
dying declarations. The presiding justice directed the jury to retire while he
heard the testimony of five witnesses as to the declarations of the decedent and
the conditions under which they were made. Having decided that the declara-
tions were admissible, the same witnesses were permitted to testify before the
jury as to the condition of the decedent, his realization of impending death, and
:as to the declarations. Held, that such procedure was proper and that it re-
mained for the jury to determine from all the circumstances the credibility of
the declarations. State v. Bordeleau (I92O, Me.) 1o8 Atl. 464.
The decision is in accord with the authorities. The court decides from all the
circumstances under which the declarations were made, their contents, and form,
whether or not they are admissible. The credibility of the declarations is, of
course, a question for the jury and they may receive evidence of the situation
in which the declarations were made. See 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 152; 16 ibid.,
456o; (19o7) i6 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 432.
EVIDENcE-REs GESTAE-SPNTANEOUS EXCLAMATION THEoR.-One Yar-
borough was in charge of a turpentine camp composed almost wholly of negroes.
One Bostick, known a§ "It," lived with a woman at a place conducted as a
saloon. The woman was heard outside at night quarreling with someone, and
Yarborough came up with a shot-gun and tried to take away this person's
pistol. It went off and mortally wounded him. Within five minutes he said
to the first white witness who came up, "Old It shot me." This was excluded,
and the accused, Yarborough's cook, was convicted of murder, for he was said
to have been chasing the woman to get back money of his which she had
stolen. Held, that the conviction was error, because, inter alia, it was a res
.gestae statement and should have been admitted. Johnson v. State (192, Tex.
Cr. App.) 218 S. W. 496.
In the attempt to make more orderly the catchall of the exceptions to the
hearsay rule, two theories have been advanced. The one is that the statement
to be admissible must be substantially contemporaneous, and that the witness
from his own observation of the circumstances shall be able in a measure to
substantiate the truth of the declarant's statement. See Thayer, Bedingfield's
Case (1881) 15 Am. L. REV. 71, 83. The other is the theory of Dean Wigmore,
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that the statement need not be contemporaneous, but must be uttered under the
stress of some startling occurrence, and within such a time after the occurrence
that the excitement is still controlling the declarant and preventing any possible
fabrication. 3 Wigmore, Evidence (19o5) sec. 1747. It is clear that the state-
ment in the above case is admissible under this latter theory, but it is hard to
see how it meets the requirement of Dean Thayer's view. It seems obvious
that a serious miscarriage of justice might take place if the statement were not
admitted, and that in this case the spontaneous exclamation theory is preferable.
For a note showing the confusion in the res gestae cases see (I9p4) 23 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 282.
HIGHWAYS--"RIGHT OF WAY"-SLEDs.-The plaintiff was injured in a collision
between a double-runner plank sled, on which she was riding, and the defend-
ant's buggy. The defendant, who was driving up the hill; failed to turn to the
right of the beaten path on the icy road, although warned by the shouts of those
at the foot of the hill and the approaching light on the sled. The plaintiff sued
for damages. Held, that she should recover, because the coaster had an equal
privilege with a horse-drawn vehicle to the use of the road, and the defendant
was negligent in failing to turn out after the warning, although the plaintiff had
been equally negligent in attempting the ride. Roennau v. Whitson (192o, Iowa)
175 N. W. 849.
The instant case in holding that the coaster had a privilege to use the road
accords with the weight of authority that coasting on country roads is not a
nuisance per se. See note 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 865. But if the road is a much
traveled public highway and the sled used carried several persons, it would seem
otherwise. See Reusch v. Licking Rolling Mills Co. (i9o4) ii8 Ky. 369, 372,
8o S. W. 1168; see Eastburn v. United States Exp. Co. (igog) 225 Pa. 33, 38,
73 Atl. 977, 979. Nor does the sound view on last clear chance stand in the way
of recovery. See (i92O) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 542, 697.
INTERNATIONAL LAw-PR IZE-CAGO CONSIGNED TO ENEMY SUBSIDIARY OF
AmRICAN CoRPoRATiO.-The Vacuum Oil Company of New York shipped a
quantity of oil f. o. b. to its Australian and German subsidiary corporations on a
German vessel. The American corporation undertook by agreement with its
subsidiaries to assume any loss arising from their failure to receive the cargo.
The stock of the European subsidiaries was owned practically entirely by the
parent company in the United States. The ship and cargo were seized as prize.
The parent company sought restoration of the goods. Held, that the goods must
be condemned, since the parent company was not the owner. The Kronprinzessin
Cecilie (Part Cargo ex) (1919, P. C.) 121 Law T. Rep. 457.
See COMMENT, supra, p. 772.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-REAONABLE AND PROBABLE CAusE.-The complaint
in an action for malicious prosecution charged that the defendant, without prob-
able cause, by falsely testifying before the grand jury procured the indictment
of the plaintiff upon which he was subsequently tried and acquitted. Held, that
the plaintiff should recover. Johnson v. Brady (1920, Ind. Apli.) 126 N. E. 25o.
The instant case seems sound and in accord with the weight of authority.
The court based its decision upon the grounds that if the evidence showed that
the defendant at no time believed the plaintiff to have been guilty of the alleged
larceny, and if he caused the indictment of the plaintiff, it was without probable
cause, and malic6 may be inferred. For the effect of a reversed judgment as
evidence in malicious prosecution, see COMMENT (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
325. For a discussion of other phases of the problems involved in the instant
case, see COMMENT (i916) 25 ibid., 328; (igog) I8 ibid., 433.
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MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE-ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-ABATEMENT OF ACTION BY
DFATH.7-The plaintiff sued for the alienation of his wife's affections. Before
the case was tried the plaintiff died and the lower court held that under section
4569 of Shannon's Code of Civil Procedure, which provided that actions for
wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff should abate by the death of either
party, the action was abated. From this judgment the administrator of the
plaintiff appealed on the ground that the suit should be revived in the name of
the ddministrator. Held, that the judgment was correct. Justice v. Clinard
(192o, Tenn.) 217 S. W. 663.
Both parties conceded that the action Would abate at common law, so this case
turns upon the interpretation of a particular provision in the Tennessee code.
For an earlier interpretation that this statute covers actions for breach of promise
of marriage, see Weeks v. May (1889) 87 Tenn. 443, 10 S. W. 771, 3 L. R. A.
212, note.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-RIGHT TO HAVE A DIVORCE-CRUELTY.-A wife sued
for divorce, alleging cruelty. Some of the facts presented to the court were
that during the twenty-two months of married life, the defendant repeatedly
called the plaintiff abusive names; had not accompanied her anywhere except
upon, two or three occasions, but spent his evenings with friends; and that he
talked to her "just as little as he could get along with." His attitude toward
her was one of cold and studied indifference; although he was thrifty and
industrious and made adequate proviqion in material things. Held, that a
decree of divorce should be granted. Kreplin v. Kreplin (1920, Wash.) 188
Pac. 14.
Whether the inference, that such "cruelty" was perpetrated as to create a
right to have a divorce, is proper depends upon the existence of a variable
aggregate of facts; for "what would be cruel to a delicate, sensitive woman
might not be so to a brawling fishwife." Button v. Button (1920, Ore.) 188
Pac. 18o. For an examination of different combinations of facts which have
been held to constitute "cruelty," which operated to create a right to have a
divorce, see COMMENT (1911) 20 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 581.
STATUTE OF FRAUDs-PARoL GIFT OF LANDS-ENFORCIBILITY.-The plaintiff
brought a writ of entry. The defendant claimed a right to recover for improve-
ments made, under a betterment statute, which allowed such claims where the
land was occupied under a supposed legal title for more than six years. Held,
that the defendant should not recover, because he had been in possession under
the "license" of the plaintiff, with a dictum that one who has taken possession
of land under a verbal gift from the owner and made permanent improvements
thereon should have a decree of specific performance of the gift. Phelan v.
Adam (192o, N. H.) 1O8 AtI. 814.
The dictum is in accord with'the great weight of authority. See 5 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence (2d ed. 1919) sec. 225o. The few jurisdictions which do
not grant specific performance in such cases recognize the promisee's right to
reimbursement for improvements and to a lien upon the land to secure payment
of their value. Cf. Glass v. Gaines (1891) 13 Ky. L. Rep. 277, 17 S. W. 161.
See- Coggins v. McKinney (iig, S. C.) 99 S. E. 844, (1920) 29 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 357
